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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON CO 
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PACKER, JR., and 
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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
On March 27, 2015, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and For 
Judgment on the Pleadings. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the briefs, and the arguments 
of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
It is well established that: 
[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint 
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes 
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of 
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought .... In deciding a 
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motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party 
who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the 
filing party's favor. 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. 
Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2) (1997)). See also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). 
According to the Complaint, Defendants Robert E. Hardy and William E. Packer are the 
founders of Rainforest Production Holdings, Inc. ("Rainforest"), a company that produces films 
directly or through its subsidiaries under the Brand name and mark Rainforest Films. Rainforest 
was registered as a Georgia corporation in 1996. Plaintiff Bernard H. Bronner invested $500,000 
of his own money and an additional $300,000 from other investors to fund a Rainforest Film 
called Trois through Defendant TRF Productions, LLC ("TRF,,).1 Bronner and TRF entered into 
Subscription Agreements concerning Bronner's investment on November 2, 1999, December 8, 
1999, January 3,2000, and February 1,2000. Bronner then became a shareholder of Rainforest. 
Bronner, Hardy and Packer each owned approximately one-third of the shares in Rainforest and 
all three were appointed directors. 
Bronner alleges that the total amount of gross box office receipts for Rainforest-produced 
and directed films exceeded half a billion dollars. Despite Rainforest's apparent success, 
however, Hardy and Packer misrepresented to Bronner that Rainforest was making little to no 
profit. Bronner claims that by mid-2010, he and other Trois investors had only been paid back 
half of their investments. Specifically, Hardy and Packer made repeated representations from 
2001 through 2010 that Trois did not return any profits despite grossing over $1.2 million in box 
office receipts. An accounting was presented to Bronner in 2011 which indicated that Trois had 
lost some $35,000. Bronner further claims that Hardy and Packer began to systematically wall 
I For context only, Defendants aver that TRF was an affiliate of Rainforest in its Counterclaim. However, the legal 
relationship, if any, between Rainforest and TRF is immaterial for the purposes ofthis Motion. 
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him off from corporate information and control, and began diverting corporate resources and 
opportunities, impermissibly raised their own salaries and diverted Rainforest funds for their 
own personal use. 
On May 15,2014, Hardy and Packer circulated a Notice of Special Meeting of 
Shareholders which disclosed their intent to dissolve Rainforest. Bronner demanded that 
Rainforest withdraw the Notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742, but his demand was rejected. 
Plaintiff s Complaint includes two direct causes of action against Hardy and Packer: 
Count 1: Oppression and Count 3: Fraud, and nine derivative causes of action against Hardy and 
Packer as officers and directors of Rainforest: Count 4: Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count 5: Lack 
of Candor; Count 6: Gross Mismanagement; Count 7: Waste of Corporate Asset; Count 8: Unjust 
Enrichment; Count 9: Abuse of Control; Count 10: Quantum Meruit; Count 10: Appointment of 
a Receiver; and Count 11: Misappropriation of Corporate Assets. Plaintiff's Complaint also 
includes Count 2: Breach of Contract claim, a direct claim against TRF for breaching the various 
subscription agreements from 1999 and 2000. 
For the reasons fully discussed below, Defendants seek dismissal of all of the direct 
claims and two of the derivative claims (Count 4: Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Count 5: Lack 
of Candor) as a matter of law. Defendants also argue that the remaining derivative claims are 
limited by the four-year statute of limitations for derivative actions and ask the Court to dismiss 
the claims as they relate to events occurring before June 20, 2010, four years before the filing of 
the Complaint. 
I. Count 1: Oppression 
Defendants argue that there is no such thing in Georgia as a claim for oppression and, to 
the extent that such a claim is created under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-940(a)(I), it can only be brought in 
3 
the context of a statutory close corporation. Under § 14-2-940(a)(1), a shareholder of a statutory 
close corporation may petition the Court for relief if the directors or those in control of the 
corporation "have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, 
or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder, director, or officer 
of the corporation." Under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-902(a), "[a] statutory close corporation is a 
corporation whose articles of incorporation contain a statement that the corporation is a statutory 
close corporation." 
Rainforest's Articles ofIncorporation, attached to and incorporated in Defendants' 
Verified Amended Answer, does not contain such a statement designating Rainforest as a 
statutory close corporation' Nor does Plaintiff allege that Rainforest is a statutory close 
corporation is his Complaint. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in his briefing or at oral 
arguments. Absent a statutory basis for the claim, the C0U11 agrees that a claim for oppression 
does not otherwise exist under Georgia common law. See McCrary v. A.A. Music Serv., Inc., 
115 Ga. App. 65, 69 (1967) ("where a petition merely alleges an oppressive course of conduct 
characterized by sharp business practices without setting forth all the necessary elements of a 
distinct tort committed during the course of the conduct resulting in damage, the petition is 
subject to general demurrer notwithstanding allegations that defendants conspired to gain 
plaintiffs business and cause his financial ruin."). As such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED as to Count 1 for Oppression. 
2 The Court may consider written instruments attached to the pleadings without converting the Motion to Dismiss 
into a Motion for Summary Judgment. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most 
favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's 
favor. Islam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 327 Ga. App. 197,197 (2014) (citing Stendahl v. Cobb County, 284 Ga. 
525(1) (2008). Such pleadings "include any exhibits attached to and incorporated into the complaint and the 
answer." Id. (citing Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, 324 Ga. App. 750 (2013)). 
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II. Count 2: Breach of Contract Against TRF 
Defendants argue that Bronner's claim against TRF for breach of the Subscription 
Agreements is barred by a 2011 Reconciliation Agreement' entered into between Bronner, Hardy 
and Packer to resolve certain disputes that had arisen. The Agreement purports to release all 
claims that Bronner has or had against "Rainforest and its affiliates," and Defendants argue that 
TRF was an affiliate of Rainforest. See Lackey v. McDowell, 262 Ga. 185 (1992) (noting that 
only those parties identified either by proper name or such other description as leaves no 
question of the identity ofthe party will be discharged by that instrument). Plaintiff argues that 
TRF cannot be released under the Reconciliation Agreement because TRF was not clearly and 
unambiguously identified in the contract. They also argue that the Reconciliation Agreement is 
unenforceable for lack of consideration, fraudulent inducement and lack of satisfaction. 
At this stage, the Court cannot say that the Reconciliation Agreement bars Plaintiff s 
claims as a matter of law because Plaintiff could introduce evidence within the framework of his 
pleading that Defendants did not properly discharged their obligations under the Reconciliation 
Agreement or that the Agreement is otherwise unenforceable. As such, it is not necessary at this 
stage to determine whether TRF is sufficiently identified in the 2011 Reconciliation Agreement 
as "an affiliate." 
Defendants also assert this claim can only be pursued derivatively. However, the claim 
in this instance is against TRF, a limited liability company, for breach of Agreements between 
TRF and Bronner, and not against Packer and Hardy as representatives of Rainforest. Therefore, 
a direct action is proper. 
As such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Count 2 for Breach of 
Contract. 
3 The 2011 Reconciliation Agreement was attached to and incorporated in Defendants' Verified Amended Answer. 
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III. Count 3: Fraud 
Defendants again argue that the claim for fraud is barred by the release of claims in the 
2011 Reconciliation Agreement. Bronner claims that Hardy and Bronner fraudulently 
misrepresented financials and accounting "related to Trois and the Company." While it is 
possible that the 2011 Reconciliation Agreement, if enforceable, bars claims related to Trois, 
Bronner could present evidence within the framework of the pleading that misrepresentations 
about the Company's finances arose after the Agreement and therefore are not barred by the 
release. 
Further, the Court finds Bronner has standing to bring a direct action for fraud. The 
Courts have recognized that a shareholder may maintain a direct action if he alleges a "special 
injury, i.e., an injury which is separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders .... " 
Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Industries, Inc., 264 Ga. 817, 819 (1994); Parks v. Multimedia 
Techs., 239 Ga. App. 282, 294 (1999). 
Here, the 2011 Reconciliation Agreement purports to create certain rights and duties for 
Bronner, Packer and Hardy only, and not the other shareholders who hold roughly 6% of 
Rainforest shares. For instance, the Agreement creates an End of Year Bonus Pool for the 
benefit of only Bronner, Hardy and Packer. At this stage in the litigation, there is sufficient 
pleading of special injury to Bronner as a shareholder and party to the Reconciliation Agreement 
to allow a direct claim for fraud. As such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to 
Count 3 for Fraud. 
IV. Count 4: Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Count 5: Lack of Candor 
Defendants argue that the derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of 
candor should be dismissed because they are barred by the 2011 Reconciliation Agreement. As 
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noted above, Plaintiff is challenging the enforceability of the 2011 Reconciliation Agreement 
and so the effect of the release contained in the Agreement cannot be determined at this stage of 
the litigation. Further, the only express parties to the Agreement were Bronner, Hardy and 
Packer, and not the other shareholders collectively holding 6% of Rainforest's shares, so it is not 
clear that all shareholders agreed to waive claims that could be brought on their behalf. Finally, 
some of the allegations of wrongdoing occurred after the 2011 Reconciliation Agreement. As 
such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Counts 4 and 5 for Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty and Lack of Candor. 
V. The Statute of Limitations for Derivative Actions 
Defendants ask the Court to limit Plaintiffs derivative claims to actions occurring within 
the four year statute of limitations for bringing derivative claims under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-831(b), 
or to actions occurring after June 20, 2010. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations was 
tolled by various misrepresentations and concealment. Generally, whether a statute of 
limitations has been tolled is an issue of fact, and therefore, should not be decided on a motion to 
dismiss. See Gen. Info. Processing Sys., Inc. v. Sweeney, 176 Ga. App. 315, 316 (1985). As 
such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to limit the claims base on the statute of limitations is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2015. 
The Honorable Melvin K. Westmoreland 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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